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Topham: Hypnotically-Induced Memories

NOTE

BORAWICK V. SHAY: THE ADMISSIBILITY
OF HYPNOTICALLY-INDUCED MEMORIES

I. INTRODUCTION

In Borawick v. Shay/ the Second Circuit considered the
circumstances under which an alleged victim of childhood sexual abuse may testify as to memories of abuse that surface
following therapeutic hypnosis in adulthood. 2 In this case of
first impression,3 the court held that admissibility of hypnotically-induced or -refreshed recollections should be determined
on a case-by-case basis. 4 In doing so, it propounded a totalityof-the-circumstances approach and considered a non-exclusive
list of factors.5 Using this approach, the Second Circuit found
that hypnotically-induced recollections of childhood sexual
1. 68 F.3d 597 (2d Cir. 1995) (per Judge Walker).
2. [d. at 598. "Hypnosis" is defined as an induced sleeplike condition in
which an individual is extremely responsive to suggestions made by the hypnotist.
THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DESK DICTIONARY 480 (1981). However, in the medical
field, there is no generally accepted definition of hypnosis. Most authorities agree
that hypnosis requires at least "superficial cooperation of the subject, the development of rapport, and the subject's focusing of attention." Council on Scientific
Affairs, Status of Refreshing Recollection by the Use of Hypnosis, 253 JAMA 1918,
1919 (April 5, 1985). [hereinafter Council on Scientific Affairs]. A simple induction
procedure follows which enables the subject to become responsive to the suggestions of the hypnotist. Thus, hypnosis involves the "focusing of attention, increased
responsiveness to suggestions, suspension of disbelief with a lowering of critical
judgment, potential for altering motor control and perception and the subjective
experience of responding involuntarily." [d. at 1919.
3. [d. at 598.
4. Borawick v. Shay, 68 F.3d 597, 608 (2d Cir. 1995).'
5. [d.
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abuse were inadmissible when uncovered through hypnosis
sessions conducted by an unqualified hypnotist who kept no
record of the sessions. 6
Numerous courts have addressed the issue of admissibility
of hypnotically-refreshed testimony resulting from hypnosis
specifically used to retrieve or enhance a memory of a particular known or suspected event. 7 In such cases, courts have often been reluctant to admit hypnotically-refreshed testimony.s
Scientific literature has not conclusively demonstrated that
therapeutic hypnosis is a consistently effective means to accurately retrieve repressed childhood memories of traumatic
events. 9 However, in light of the Second Circuit's holding in
6. [d. at 609.
7. [d. at 600. See Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (1986) (hypnosis used to
help criminal defendant recall events leading up to the murder for which she was
charged); McQueen v. Garrison, 814 F.2d 951 (4th Cir. 1987) (hypnosis used to
help eyewitness recall more clearly events leading up to a murder); United States
v. Valdez, 722 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1984) (hypnosis used to help Texas Ranger
identify defendant whom the Ranger already knew to be under suspicion); Little v.
Armontrout, 819 F.2d 1425 (8th Cir. 1987) (hypnosis used to help a rape victim
remember her assailant); Sprynczynatyk v. General Motors Corp., 771 F.2d 1112
(8th Cir. 1985) (hypnosis used to help driver of car recall whether he applied the
brakes before an accident occurred); Harker v. State, 800 F.2d 437 (4th Cir. 1986)
(hypnosis used to aid victim of a shooting in recalling his assailant); Kline v. Ford
Motor Co., 523 F.2d 1067 (9th Cir. 1975) (hypnosis used to enable amnesia sufferer remember details of a car accident in which she was a passenger in one of the
cars); People v. Shirley, 723 P.2d 1354 (Cal. 1982), cert. denied 459 U.S. 860
(1982) (hypnosis used to refresh recollection regarding the subject's claim of rape);
State v. Iwakiri, 682 P.2d 571 (Idaho 1984) (hypnosis used to refresh witness'
memory in a kidnapping case); People v. Zayas, 546 N.E.2d 513 (Ill. 1989) (hypnosis used to more closely recall a license plate number at the scene of a crime);
State v. Hurd, 432 A.2d 86 (N.J. 1981) (hypnosis used to identify assailant in a
stabbing); State v. Tuttle, 780 P.2d 1203 (Utah 1989) (hypnosis used on a witness
to better recall details of the criminal defendant).
8. Borawick v. Shay, 68 F.3d 597, 600 (2d Cir. 1995). See United States v.
Valdez, 722 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1984) (hypnotically-induced testimony not admitted
because hypnotized subject knew that person he identified through hypnosis was
already under suspicion); Little v. Armontrout, 819 F.2d 1425 (8th Cir. 1987) (hypnotically-induced testimony not admitted because it was violation of defendant's
due process rights); Sprynczynatyk v. General Motors Corp., 771 F.2d 1112 (8th
Cir. 1985) (hypnotically-induced testimony not admitted); People v. Shirley, 723
P.2d 1354 (Cal. 1982), cert. denied 459 U.S. 860 (1982) (hypnotically-induced testimony admissible if based on pre-hypnotic memories, otherwise, not admissible);
People v. Zayas, 546 N.E.2d 513 (Ill. 1989) (hypnotically-induced testimony other
than that of the defendant not admitted); State v. Hurd, 432 A.2d 86 (N.J. 1981)
(hypnotically-induced testimony not admitted); State v. Tuttle, 780 P.2d 1203 (Utah
1989) (hypnotically-induced testimony not admitted).
9. Borawick v. Shay, 68 F.3d 597, 606-607 (2nd Cir. 1995). According to the
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Borawick, courts may be more flexible in their approach to the
admissibility question concerning memories refreshed through
hypnosis. 10
This Note will trace the facts and history of the Borawick
case. l l This Note will then discuss reliability problems associated with hypnotically-induced memories as well as the various approaches to admissibility of hypnotically-refreshed testimony.12 An explanation of the Second Circuit Court's analysis
in Borawick follows. 1s Finally, the Note will critique the
Court's reasoning and suggest a possible remedy for the shortcomings of the Second Circuit's chosen approach to admissibility.14
II. FACTS
Joan Borawick alleged that her aunt, Christine Shay, and
her uncle, Morrie Shay, sexually abused her in the Shay home
during Borawick's 1961 and 1964 summer visits. 15 At the time
Council on Scientific Affairs (See supra note 2), most studies of hypnotically-refreshed memory fail to provide corroboration of memories recovered in hypnosis
and fail to establish that hypnosis was responsible for any effects observed. For
example, one study simply included subjective impressions of investigators regarding the validity of the memories recovered. Another study found no clear evidence
in clinical or experimental literature that hypnosis can improve memory. Other reviewers found that accurate memories can occur but that hypnosis can also lead to
false recollections and confabulation. Council on Scientific Affairs, supra note 2, at
1920-21.
10. Borawick v. Shay, 68 F.3d 597, 609 (2d Cir. 1995). Here, the plaintiff relied heavily on the arguments in Jacqueline Kanovitz, Hypnotic Memories and Civil Sexual Abuse Trials, 45 VAND. L. REv. 1185 (1992) [hereinafter Kanovitz).
Kanovitz argued that hypnosis functions more reliably when used therapeutically
than when it is used to refresh memory regarding a specific event. She concludes
that courts should be more willing to accept testimony based on retrieval of repressed memories. Kanovitz at 1213. The Second Circuit acknowledged the arguments made by Kanovitz yet pointed out that no agreement as to the reliability of
such testimony exists. A~ordingly, the court was unwilling to assume that the
risks of suggestibility, confabulation, and memory hardening are reduced when
hypnosis is used for therapeutic purposes. Borawick v. Shay, 68 F.3d 597, 606-607
(2d Cir. 1995).
11. See infra notes 15-52 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 53-133 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 134-199 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 200-259 and accompanying text.
15. Borawick v. Shay, 68 F.3d 597, 598-99 (2d Cir. 1995). Valerian St. Regis,
the hypnotist who treated Borawick, testified that while under hypnosis, Borawick
described episodes of "ritual dancing" involving Christine Shay when Borawick was
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of those visits, Borawick was four and seven years old, respectively.16
After years of psychiatric and psychological treatment for
panic attacks, Borawick sought medical treatment for chronic
physical illness in the spring of 1987 from Dr. Ronald Peters, a
medical doctor in Santa Monica, California. 17 Dr. Peters re- .
ferred Borawick to Valerian St. Regis, a hypnotist working
under his supervision. IS Peters believed that problems in
childhood sometimes cause chronic illness in adulthood and,
further, that such problems are susceptible to recall through
hypnosis. 19 Beginning in the summer of 1987 and continuing
through the fall of 1988, Borawick underwent 12 to 14 hypnotherapy sessions with St. RegiS.20 Before and immediately
after these sessions, Borawick had no recollection of any abuse
by the Shays or by anyone else. 21
Although St. Regis attended and gave lectures on the topic
of hypnosis, and belonged to several recognized professional
organizations centered on hypnosis, he did not hold a medical
degree and had no education beyond high school. 22 He was not
licensed in California as a clinical psychologist23 and was not
four years old, anal and vaginal object penetration by Christine Shay, and anal
rape by Morrie Shay. Id. at 599.
16. Id. at 598.
17. Id. Borawick had been under the supervision of a number of physicians
and therapists since 1980. During the fall of 1984, Borawick began to experience
panic attacks. In 1985, she sought and received psychiatric treat~ent for the panic
attacks on five or six occasions. Subsequently, a psychologist continued this
treatment from April 1986 to July 1987. Id.
18. Id. at 598. Valerian St. Regis was 71 years old at the time of this action.
At fifteen, St. Regis apprenticed with a retired Swiss psychiatrist, traveling in
search of "faith healers." After apprenticing with the psychiatrist, St. Regis worked
as a "stage hypnotist" on tour boats, and at nightclubs and resorts. He testified to
being a hypnotherapist "on and ofT for 50 years." In 1987, Dr. Peters hired him as
a consultant for the Pacific Medical Center, which St. Regis described as a "rather
eclectic clinic." St. Regis had his own clinic, the St. Regis Modality Center.
Borawick v. Shay, 842 F. Supp. 1501, 1507 (0: Conn. 1994).
19. Borawick v. Shay, 68 F.3d 597, 598 (2d Cir. 1995).
20. Id.
21. Id. at 598-99.
22. Borawick v. Shay, 842 F. Supp. 1501, 1507-1508 (D. Conn. 1994).
23. California Business & Professions Code § 2905 indicates that the "practice
of psychology shall be defined as in Section 2903." California Business & Professions Code § 2903 states:
No person may engage in the practice of psycholo-
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a member of the American Society of Clinical Hypnosis. 24 Furthermore, St. Regis had not previously appeared in court as an
expert in hypnotherapy.25 St. Regis testified that he kept no
permanent records relating to his sessions with Borawick and
that before hypnotizing her he had no expectation as to the
type of information the hypnosis would uncover.26 He used
regression therapy to take Borawick back to the time between
ages three and five. 27 St. Regis explained that he did not use
hypnotic suggestion but instead asked broad questions such as

gy, or represent himself to be a psychologist, without a
license granted under this chapter.... The practice of psychology is defined as rendering or offering to render for a
fee to individuals, groups, organizations or the public any
psychological service involving the application of psychological principles, methods, and procedures of understanding, predicting, and influencing behavior, such as the
principles pertaining to learning, perception, motivation,
emotions, and interpersonal relationships; and the methods and procedures of interviewing, counseling, psychotherapy, behavior modification, and hypnosis; ....
The application of such principles and methods includes, but is not restricted to: diagnosis, prevention,
treatment, and amelioration of psychological problems and
emotional and mental disorders of individuals and group ....
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2903 (West 1995).
See also California Business & Professions Code § 2908 which states:
Nothing in this chapter [§ 2900 et seq) shall be
construed to prevent qualified members of other recognized professional groups licensed to practice in the State
of California, such as, but not limited to, ... persons utilizing
hypnotic techniques by referral from persons licensed to
practice medicine,...from doing work of a psychological
nature consistent with the laws governing their respective
professions, provided they do not hold themselves out to
the public by any title... [incorporating the word "psychology").

CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2908 (WEST 1995).
24. Borawick v. Shay, 842 F. Supp. 1501, 1507 (D. Conn. 1994).
25. 1d. at 1507.
26. Borawick v. Shay, 68 F.3d 597, 599 (2d Cir. 1995).
27. Borawick v. Shay, 842 F. Supp. 1501, 1507-1508 (D. Conn. 1994). The
court considered St. Regis' credentials highly suspect. 1d. See also Council on Scientific Affairs, supra note 2, at 1919. In regression therapy, hypnosis is used to
re-experience feelings associated with a traumatic event. Subjects may behave in a
manner that seems appropriate for the age when the traumatic event allegedly occurred. Sometimes these events are relived intensely, so that a person may describe the event in great detail. 1d. at 1919.
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"what happened?,,28 He claimed that during these sessions
Borawick described episodes of ritual sexual abuse by Christine Shay and later by Morrie Shay.29 St. Regis further testified that he did not reveal Borawick's descriptions of the abuse
to her because he felt to do so would have been "devastating"
and because he believed that the memories would most likely
surface in time. 30
Borawick testified that she experienced her first non-hypnotic memory of childhood sexual abuse by her father in February 1989, almost one y~ar after her final session with St.
RegiS.31 In that same month, Borawick experienced her first
non-hypnotic ally-induced memory of abuse by Christine
Shay.32 Borawick stated that her first memory of abuse by
Morrie Shay surfaced in 1990. 33 She also claimed to recall
abuse by numerous others, including family members and her
father's friends. 34 Specifically, Borawick testified that she recalled being raped and sexually abused at the age of three by
men whom she believed to be members of the Masons, and
that she also remembered being forced to drink blood at a
ritual involving a dead pig and people dressed in black

28. Borawick v. Shay, 68 F.3d 597, 599 (2d Cir. 1995).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 599. Borawick's father was not a defendant in this matter. Id.
Borawick had her first recollection of sexual abuse by a family member while driving in her car after a troublesome appointment with a holistic doctor. She continued to have additional memories every day or every other day thereafter. Two
days later, Borawick had a telephone conversation with her sister who was living
in a halfway house. During this conversation, Borawick's sister revealed an incident of abuse by Christine Shay. Upon hearing of this alleged abuse, Borawick experienced a "flashback" and felt like her "lungs were collapsing," causing her to
"gasp for breath." Borawick v. Shay, 842 F. Supp. 1501, 1502-1503 (D. Conn.
1994).
32. Borawick v. Shay, 68 F.3d 597, 599 (2d Cir. 1995). Subsequent memories
of abuse surfaced in "bits and pieces." Later on the night of Borawick's conversation with her sister in February 1989 and at times thereafter until 1990 or 1991,
Borawick had additional memories of grotesque sexual abuse by her aunt, Christine Shay. Later in 1990-1991, Borawick experienced further memories of abuse by
Christine Shay. Borawick v. Shay, 842 F. Supp. 1501, 1503 (D. Conn. 1994).
33. Borawick v. Shay, 68 F.3d 597, 599 (2d Cir. 1995).
34. Id. at 609. The Second Circuit stated that Borawick's testimony was too
incredible to be believed. The court remarked that Borawick leveled "fanciful accusations" of sexual abuse against numerous people both familiar and unfamiliar
to her and that these wild, uncorroborated accusations "erodes [their) confidence"
in the allegations against the Shays. Id.
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gowns. 36

III. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On January 24, 1992, more than three years after her
final session with St. Regis and almost three years after her
first post-hypnotic recollections of sexual abuse, Borawick
commenced an action against Christine and Morrie Shay.36
Borawick alleged willful, wanton, and malicious sexual exploitation by the Shays in 1961 and 1964 and sought compensatory.and punitive damages from the. defendants. 37
Subsequently, the Shays filed an in limine motion seeking
to exclude Borawick's testimony concerning her alleged hypnotically-refreshed memories. S8 The magistrate noted the existence of three different approaches to the question of admissibility of testimony of a previously hypnotized individua1. 39
These approaches included per se admissibility, per se inadmissibility, and the procedural safeguards theory.40 Relying
on the procedural safeguards theory, the magistrate recommended granting the Shays' in limine motion, principally on
the ground that St. Regis lacked appropriate qualifications. 41
While Borawick's objections to the magistrate's in limine
ruling were pending in the district court, the United States
Supreme Court decided Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals,42 which defined the proper standard for the
admission of expert testimony.43 Borawick moved for reconsid35. [d. at 609.
36. Borawick v. Shay, 842 F. Supp. 1501, 1501 (D. Conn. 1994).
37. [d.
38. [d. at 1502.
39. [d. at 1504.
40. [d. These approaches are discussed at length in the background section of
this note. See infra notes 53-133 and accompanying text.
41. Borawick v. Shay, 842 F. Supp. 1501, 1508 (D. Conn. 1994). The magistrate judge made an initial ruling on the in limine motion on March 24, 1993, setting forth the procedure that would be followed in deciding the in limine motion.
The magistrate judge issued a ruling on May 26, 1993, after, receiving further submissions from the parties. Borawick v. Shay, 68 F.3d 597, 599 (2d Cir. 1995).
42. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
43. [d. In Daubert, the Supreme Court held that the test set forth in Frye v.
United States, 293F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923) for determining the proper standard
for admission of expert testimony was superseded by the Federal Rules of Evi-
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eration of the in limine ruling in light of Daubert, maintaining
that Daubert set a new standard for admitting scientific evidence. 44 She claimed that the testimony resulting from her
therapeutic use of hypnosis should be admitted because it
satisfied the Daubert requirements for admission of scientific
evidence. 45 The magistrate reconsidered the motion and reaffirmed her earlier ruling to exclude the post-hypnotic testimony.46 The district court adopted the magistrate's recommendation. 47
The Shays subsequently moved for summary judgment,
which the magistrate recommended granting. 48 The district
court adopted this recommendation and entered summary
judgment in favor of the Shays on May 10, 1994. 49 Borawick·
appealed that judgment to the Second Circuit. 50
On October 17, 1995, the Second Circuit affirmed the summary judgment for the Shays after considering the due process
and other claims raised by Borawick. 51 The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari in May 1996. 52

dence. The Court ruled that judges must determine whether an expert's testimony
is scientifically valid before the testimony may be admitted. The flexible inquiry
included examination of whether the theory had been tested, whether it had been
subjected to peer review, what the potential or known error rate is, what sort of
standards control the technique's operation, and whether the theory or technique
has been generally accepted. [d. at 585-89. The Court assigned judges a
"gatekeeping role" for the admissibility of scientific evidence. [d. at 597.
44. Borawick v. Shay, 68 F.3d 597, 599-600 (2d Cir. 1995). The Second Circuit
did not believe that Daubert was directly applicable to the issue in Borawick's
case. The court pointed out that Daubert concerned the admissibility of data derived from scientific techniques or expert opinions. However, the issues in
Borawick were whether the plaintiff was a competent witness or whether her lay
testimony was admissible. [d. at 610.
45. [d. The influence of the Daubert decision will be examined further. See in·
fra notes 190·99 and accompanying text.
46. Borawick v. Shay, 842 F. Supp. 1501, 1509 (D. Conn. 1994).
47. [d. at 1501.
48. Borawick v. Shay, 68 F.3d 597, 600 (2d Cir. 1995).
49. [d.
50. [d. at 597.
51. [d. at 610. See infra notes 134·199 and accompanying text.
52. Borawick v. Shay, 116 S.Ct. 1869 (1996).
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IV. BACKGROUND
Although the American Medical Association recognized
hypnosis as a valid therapeutic technique in 1958, the accuracy
of hypnotic recall has no established foundation. 53 Further, no
consensus exists regarding the ability of hypnosis to enhance
memory. 54 Generally, scientists fall into two categories concerning the issue of the effectiveness of hypnosis for memory
enhancement. 55 One group of scientists optimistically regards
hypnosis as simply an enhancement of the memory retrieval
process and believes that the brain stores information like a
videotape. 56 According to this theory, loss of memory is the
inability to play back that videotape; hypnosis simply facilitates that retrieval. 57 Another group of scientists rejects this
theory and views memory as much more complex. 58 These scientists espouse a "constructionist theory',59 of memory which
holds that many factors influence a memory as the brain creates representations of perceived events. 60 The constructionists believe that because memory is so malleable, hypnosis
could actually distort memory over time. 61

~

53. Council on Scientific Mairs, supra note 2, at 1918. See also Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (1987). In this case, the United States Supreme Court held
that, on constitutional grounds, a state's legitimate interest in barring unreliable
evidence did not justify a per se exclusion of hypnotically-induced testimony by a
criminal defendant. A criminal defendant has a constitutional right, derived from
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Compulsory Process
Clause of the Sixth Amendment and the Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination, to testify in his or her own behalf. Further, the court held that the
testimony must be corroborated and subject to several procedural safeguards. [d.
54. Council on Scientific Mairs, supra note 2, at 1918.
55. Borawick v. Shay, 68 F.3d 597, 602 (2d Cir. 1995); See generally Council
on Scientific Mairs, supra note 2.
56. Borawick v. Shay, 68 F.3d 597, 602 (2d Cir. 1995). See also Harker V.
Maryland, 800 F.2d 437, 439 (4th Cir. 1986); United States V. Valdez, 722 F.2d
1196, 1200 (5th Cir. 1984); Little V. Armontrout, 819 F.2d 1425, 1429 (8th Cir.),
affd 835 F.2d 1240 (8th Cir. 1987) (en bane), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1210 (1988).
57. Borawick V. Shay, 68 F.3d 597, 602 (2d Cir. 1995).
58. [d.
59. [d.
60. [d. (citing United States V. Valdez, 722 F.2d 1196, 1200 (5th Cir. 1984».
This memory evolves over time as additional input is received. Borawick V. Shay,
68 F.3d 597, 603 (2d Cir. 1995).
61. [d. at 603.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1997

9

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 3 [1997], Art. 8

432

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27:423

A. RELIABILITY PROBLEMS AsSOCIATED WITH HYPNOTICALLYINDUCED MEMORIES

Although scientists differ on the effectiveness of hypnosis
as a memory-enhancing tool, courts identify several problems
with the reliability of hypnotically-refreshed recall. 62 Memories resulting from hypnosis are subject to enhancement in the
form of suggestibility,63 confabulation64 and memory hardening.65 As a result of these phenomena, memories recalled by
hypnosis can be a "mosaic of (1) appropriate actual events, (2)
entirely irrelevant actual events, (3) pure fantasy, and (4)
fantasized details supplied to make a logical whole."66
A person undergoing hypnosis becomes more susceptible to
suggestion. 67 Further, a hypnotized person may confabulate,
that is, fill in gaps in a memory to make it understandable. 58
Suggestibility and confabulation spring from a desire to experience a successful hypnosis session and to have complete memories, thereby pleasing the hypnotist. 69 Hypnosis can also result in a phenomenon called memory hardening, which gives
. the subject enhanced confidence in the facts remembered, regardless of whether the facts are true or false. 70 Finally, after

62. Borawick v. Shay, 68 F.3d 597, 603 (2d Cir. 1995).
63. "Suggestible" is defined as easily influenced or led by suggestion. THE
AMERICAN HERITAGE DESK DICTIONARY 927 (1981).
64. "Confabulate" is defined as to talk informally; to chat. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DESK DICTIONARY 218 (1981). Confabulate means to fill in the gaps in
memory to make the memory comprehensible. Borawick v. Shay, 68 F.3d 597, 603
(2d Cir. 1995).
65. Borawick v. Shay, 68 F.3d 597, 603 (2d Cir. 1995). "Memory hardening"
causes enhanced confidence in the facts remembered, whether true or false. Id.
66. Id. (quoting Bernard L. Diamond, Inherent Problems in the Use of Pretrial
Hypnosis on a Prospectiue Witness, 68 CAL. L. REv. 313, 335 (1980».
67. Borawick v. Shay, 68 F.3d 597, 603 (2d Cir. 1995). A hypnotist may intentionally or unintentionally give verbal or nonverbal cues to a subject, who then
may incorporate that cue into the recalled memory. Suggestibility may be enhanced by the desire to make the hypnosis session successful thereby pleasing the
hypnotist. Id.
68. Id. The gaps are filled with irrelevant or unrelated facts and pure fantasy.
As with susceptibility, confabulation can occur because of a desire to have complete and comprehensible memories to please the hypnotist. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. This increased confidence is not indicative of the accuracy of the memory recalled through hypnosis and makes it more difficult for the jury or an expert
to determine the credibility of the testimony. Id.
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using hypnosis to refresh memory, individuals may lose the
ability to distinguish between accurate and inaccurate memories.71
B. APPROACHES TO THE QUESTION OF ADMISSIBILITY OF HypNOTICALLy-INDUCED TESTIMONY

With these reliability problems in mind, courts generally
follow one of four different approaches to the question of admissibility of hypnotically-induced testimony: per se admissibility, per se inadmissibility, the procedural safeguards theory,
and the totality-of-the-circumstances theory.72 The Second
Circuit examined each of these approaches. 78
1. Per se admissibility approach

Some courts treat hypnotically-refreshed testimony as per
se admissible under the theory that hypnosis goes to the question of witness credibility, not witness competence. 74 The 1968
Maryland case, Harding v. State,76 followed this approach
which permitted hypnotically-refreshed testimony resulting
from hypnosis performed by a qualified professional. 76
Admitting hypnotically-induced testimony without restriction, even while informing the jury of the potential problems of
71. [d. The subject becomes more prone to speculation than if the subject had
relied on normal memory recall. This phenomenon may also result in "source amnesia" where the subject believes that a statement heard prior to hypnosis is a
product of the subject's memory. [d.
72. Borawick v. Shay, 68 F.3d 597, 604-605 (2d Cir. 1995).
73. [d. at 604-609.
[d. See, e.g., Kline v. Ford Motor Co., 523 F.2d 1067, 1069 (9th Cir. 1975)
("That present memory depends upon refreshment claimed to have been induced
under hypnosis goes to the credibility of [the witness'] testimony not to [the
witness'] competence as a witness.").
75. Harding v State, 246 A.2d 302 (Md. 1968).
76. [d. This case involved a rape and shooting victim who recalled a more
clear picture of the events surrounding her experience with the accused after undergoing hypnosis. The court held that the testimony of the victim was sufficient
to support the jury's verdict, since the hypnosis procedure was performed by a
qualified professional under circumstances which leaned toward credibility. Although this case is credited as being the fll'St to espouse the per se admissibility
approach, the court's reasoning is remarkably similar to that used in determining
admissibility under the procedural safeguards theory. For a discussion of the procedural safeguards theory, see infra notes 102-115. Id.
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such testimony, creates the danger of having a lay jury speculate as to the consequences of the use of particular hypnosis
techniques. 77 The per se admissibility approach requires great
faith in the jury's ability to accurately weigh the credibility of
the previously hypnotized witness' testimony in light of crossexamination, jury instructions, and expert testimony relating
to hypnosis. 78 However, popular misconceptions regarding the
accuracy and reliability of hypnotically-refreshed memory may
cause a jury to believe that hypnosis is a "panacea for lost
memory.,,79 Consequently, the jury may disregard expert testimony suggesting the inaccuracy and unreliability of hypnotically-induced testimony.8o The per se admissibility approach,
therefore, could be inadequate to protect defendants in civil or
criminal cases from unfounded charges. 81
Moreover, witnesses who have undergone hypnosis are
virtually immune to effective cross examination due to memory
hardening, suggestibility, or confabulation. 82 Although the per
se admissibility approach was popular when courts initially
addressed the admissibility question, courts have increasingly
disfavored this approach and have rarely followed it since
1980.83
2. Per se inadmissibility approach

At the other end of the spectrum, some courts adopt the
per se inadmissibility approach when considering hypnoticallyrefreshed testimony, presuming that the witness is incompetent to testify to such matters.54 Courts using this approach
cite the possible distortion of memory due to hypnosis as im-

77. Borawick v. Shay, 68 F.3d 597, 607 (2d Cir. 1995).

78. [d. at 604. See also People v. Zayas, 546 N.E.2d 513 (Ill. 1989).
79. People v. Zayas, 546 N.E.2d 513, 516 (Ill. 1989).

80. [d. See also 27 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & VICTOR J. GoLD, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE § 6011 at 124, 127 (1990) [hereinafter WRIGHT
GoLD).
81. Borawick v. Shay, 68 F.3d 597, 607 (2d Cir. 1995).
82. People v. Zayas, 546 N.E.2d 513, 516 (Ill. 1989).
83. Borawick v. Shay, 68 F. 3d 597, 604 (2d Cir. 1995). See also People
Zayas, 546 N.E.2d 513, 516 (Ill. 1989).
84. Borawick v. Shay, 68 F. 3d 597, 604 (2d Cir. 1995). See also People
Shirley, 723 P.2d 1354 (Cal. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 860 (1982); People
Zayas, 546 N.E.2d 513, 516 (Ill. 1989).
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possible to circumvent and so substantial that "the game is not
worth the candle.,,85 Advocates of this approach deem the evidence inadmissible, reasoning that no safeguards can adequately ensure reliability.86
Use of the per se inadmissibility approach avoids the problem of reliability altogether but ignores Federal Rule of Evidence 601 which contains a presumption of witness competence. 87 Further, per se exclusion risks the elimination of reliable testimony.88
A landmark case construing this approach is People v.
Shirley.89 This California Supreme Court case involved testimony of a previously hypnotized witness regarding the events
of the night she was allegedly raped. 90 The court held that because hypnosis is so widely viewed as unreliable, the witness'
testimony as to all matters relating to events remembered
after the hypnosis was inadmissible. 91 The Shirley court distinguished the Maryland decision in Harding by noting that
analysis of the admissibility question in Harding simply reiterated that hypnosis goes to the weight, and not to the admissibility, of the testimony.92

85. Borawick v. Shay, 68 F.3d 597, 604 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing People v. Shirley, 723 P.2d 1354 (Cal. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 860 (1982».
86. Borawick v. Shay, 68 F.3d 597, 604 (2d Cir. 1995).
87. Id. at 607. Federal Rule of Evidence 601 states:
Every person is competent to be a witness except
as otherwise provided in these rules. However, in civil
actions and proceedings, with respect to an element of a
claim or defense as to which State law supplies the rule
of decision, the competency of a witness shall be determined in accordance with State law.
FED. R. EVID. 601.
Federal Rule of Evidence 601 "abolished almost all grounds for witness
disqualification based on new assumptions that took a more optimistic view of
witness reliability and jury perceptiveness." WRIGHT & GoLD, supra note 80, at
124.
88. Borawick v. Shay, 68 F.3d 597, 607 (2d Cir. 1995).
89. People v. Shirley, 723 P.2d 1354 (Cal. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 860
(1982).
90. Id.
9!. Id. at 1375.
92. Id. at 1364.
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Subsequent to early decisions involving hypnosis, courts
began to acknowledge the dangers inherent in the use of hypnosis to refresh memory.93 Although certain courts developed
safeguards permitting the admission of such testimony,94 the
Shirley court declared that no amount of safeguards could
eliminate these dangers. 95 Accordingly, the Shirley court applied the per se inadmissibility approach and did not allow
hypnotically-induced testimony into evidence. 96
With regard to previously hypnotized criminal defendants,
the United States Supreme Court ruled that Arkansas' per se
inadmissibility rule was unconstitutiona1. 97 In Rock v. Arkansas,98 the Court acknowledged the problems involved in hypnosis, but concluded that certain procedural safeguards could
reduce the impact of potential problems. 99 The Court held
that per se inadmissibility was largely an "arbitrary" rule that
violated a criminal defendant's right to testify on his or her
own behalf.loo The Court explicitly limited its holding that

93. [d. at 1364-65. These dangers include memory hardening, suggestibility,
and confabulation. See supra notes 62-71 and accompanying text.
94. For example, the Ninth Circuit suggested several safeguards for use in
criminal cases to eliminate "potential for abuse." See United States v. Adams, 581
F.2d 193, 198-199 (9th Cir. 1978). In United States v. Awkard, 597 F.2d 667, 669
(9th Cir. 1979), the court explained, in another footnote, that the purpose of the
Adams safeguards is "to ensure that post-hypnosis statements are truly the
subject's own recollections." Procedural safeguards continued to gain acceptance in
other courts. See People v. Smrekar, 385 N.E.2d 848 (lll. 1979) (where the court
held admissible the testimony of a previously hypnotized witness only because a
number of factors in the record indicated reliability). The procedural safeguards
theory became more elaborate and was finally enunciated as a test in State v.
Hurd, 432 A.2d 86 (N.J. 1981); see infra notes 102-115 and accompanying text.
95. People v. Shirley, 723 P.2d 1354, 1365-1366 (Cal. 1982), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 860 (1982).
96. [d. at 1366, 1386-87.
97. Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (1987).
98. [d. Here, a criminal defendant was hypnotized in order to refresh her
memory of the precise details of a shooting. [d.
99. [d. at 49-53. The Supreme Court found that, like the truthfulness of other
witnesses, the defendant's veracity regarding post-hypnotic testimony could be adequately tested by cross-examination. [d. at 52.
100. [d. at 51-53, 61. The Supreme Court, while not completely prepared to
endorse the use of hypnosis as an investigative tool, stated that Arkansas had not
justified the exclusion of the whole of a defendant's testimony that the defendant
is unable to prove as being the product of pre-hypnosis memory. Further, the
Court found that wholesale inadmissibility of a defendant's testimony is an "arbitrary restriction" on the right to testify in the absence of clear evidence by the
State repudiating the validity of all post-hypnotic recollections. [d.
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the per se inadmissibility approach is unconstitutional by refusing to address the appropriate rule for a witness other than
a previously hypnotized criminal defendant. 101
3. Procedural safeguards approach
The procedural safeguards approach, along with the totality-of-the-circumstances approach discussed infra, provides a
middle ground for analyzing the admissibility question. l02 In
particular, this approach attempts to account for the shortcomings of the per se theories. lOa
The New Jersey Supreme Court articulated the procedural
safeguards theory in the seminal case of State v. Hurd. 104 The
New Jersey Court established and required adherence to a
certain set of safeguards to ensure reliability of hypnoticallyrefreshed memories before admission of the testimony.105 According to the court's opinion, the inflexible rule of per se inadmissibility allowed the possibility of excluding evidence equally
as trustworthy as eyewitness testimony.106
In order to allow testimony based on hypnotically-refreshed memories, the court adopted several procedural safeguards. l07 First, a psychologist or psychiatrist experienced in
the use of hypnosis must conduct the hypnosis session. lOS
Second, the hypnotist should be independent of, and not regularly employed by, either party to the action. 109 Third, any
information given to the hypnotist by the parties or by law en-

101. [d. at 58 n.15.
102. Borawick v. Shay, 68 F.3d 597, 605 (2d Cir. 1995).
103. [d.
104. 432 A.2d 86 (N.J. 1981).
105. [d. at 96-97.
106. [d. at 94.
107. [d. at 96-97. The court adopted these requirements on the suggestion of
Dr. Martin Orne, a renowned expert witness in the area of hypnosis. The court
stated that "fb)efore [a party) may introduce hypnotically-refreshed testimony, the
party must demonstrate compliance with these requirements. D [d. at 96.
108. [d. at 96. The hypnotist should also be qualified as an expert to aid the
trier of fact in evaluating the procedures used in the session. [d.
109. State v. Hurd, 432 A.2d 86 (N.J. 1981). This safeguard attempts to ensure
that bias does not motivate the professional to ask leading questions or engage in
other suggestive conduct with the subject. [d.
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forcement officials prior to the hypnosis session must be recorded. 110 Fourth, a detailed record of any pre-hypnosis memories elicited from the subject must exist before hypnosis begins. 111 Fifth, all contact between the subject and the hypnotist during the hypnosis session must be recorded. 112 Sixth,
during all phases of the hypnosis, from the pre-hypnosis interview to any post-hypnotic discussion, only the hypnotist and
the subject may be present. 113
The Hurd court further required the assessment of the
reliability, and consequently the admissibility, of such testimony according to a non-exclusive list of considerations. 114
These considerations include the type of memory loss that the
hypnosis restored as well as the specific technique used,
whether the m~mory loss is likely to result in normal recall if
hypnosis is properly used, and whether the witness has any
discernible motivation for remembering a false version of
events. 115
4. Totality-of-the-circumstances approach

The totality-of-the-circumstances approach is the theory
most often used by the federal courts in cases that examine the
admissibility of hypnotically-induced testimony.116 This flexi110. [d. at 96. This safeguard helps the court determine the type of information
the hypnotist could have given to the subject during the session either directly or
through suggestion. [d.
111. [d. With this description, the hypnotist can avoid influencing the facts as
the subject remembered them before hypnosis and can also avoid adding new details. [d.
112. [d. at 97. With this safeguard, a record will exist of the pre-hypnosis interview, the hypnotic session itself, and the post-hypnotic discussion. This record
will enable the trier of fact to determine the reliability of the procedures used
during the sessions. [d.
113. [d. Although other people more familiar with the situation may be better
able to conduct some of the questioning, the risk of unacceptable questions resulting in suggestibility is high. [d.
114. State v. Hurd, 432 A.2d 86, 95-96 (N.J. 1981).
115. [d. at 97. Several courts have followed the Hurd safeguard theory or a
theory modeled on the Hurd factors. See House v. State, 445 So. 2d 815, 826-827
(Miss. 1984); State v. Weston, 475 N.E.2d 805, 813 (Ohio 1984).
116. Borawick v. Shay, 68 F.3d 597, 605 (2d Cir. 1995). See also WRIGHT &
GoLD, supra note 80, at 171-73. Cases following the totality-of-the-circumstances
approach include McQueen v. Garrison, 814 F.2d 951 (4th Cir. 1987) cert. denied,
484 U.S. 944 (1987); Wicker v. McCotter, 783 F.2d 487 (5th Cir. 1986) cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1010 (1986); Sprynczynatyk v. General Motors Corp., 771 F.2d 1112
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ble approach to the admissibility question avoids the rigidity of
the other approaches. ll7 In particular, this approach focuses
on the issue of reliability, and therefore admissibility, of the
proffered hypnotically-induced testimony.118
The totality-of-the-circumstances approach allows a judge
to examine all relevant circumstances that affect reliability.119 The approach requires a factual inquiry into the hypnosis procedures used to evaluate reliability.120 Corroborating
evidence, if present, must be examined to further balance the
effect of the testimony that results from hypnosis. 121 In addition, the court must assess the purpose of the hypnosis, the
possibility of pre-hypnotic suggestions, the presence of a permanent record of the session, the qualifications of the hypnotist, the subject's susceptibility to hypnosis, and the expert
testimony regarding reliability. 122 The court should weigh
these factors when exercising its discretion whether to admit
the hyPnotically-induced testimony.123
The totality-of-the-circumstances approach is preferable to
the strict procedural safeguards theory because the presence or
absence of procedural safeguards may not always mitigate the
problems associated with hypnotically-induced testimony, such
as suggestibility, confabulation, and memory hardening.124 If
the court applies the procedural safeguard approach, hypnosis
may take on an "aura of reliability" which may mislead the
jury to disregard the potential dangers. 125 A finding of the
presence of the Hurd procedural safeguards does not compel
admission' of hypnotically-induced testimony and, conversely, a
finding of the absence of the safeguards does not require the

(8th Cir. 1985) cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1046 (1986).
117. Borawick v. Shay, 68 F.3d 597, 607 (2d Cir. 1995).
118. [d.
119. [d. at 608.
120. [d.
121. [d.
122. Borawick v. Shay, 68 F.3d 597, 608 (2d Cir. 1995). Essentially the
Borawick court followed approaches used by the Fourth Circuit in McQueen v.
Garrison, 814 F.2d 951 (4th Cir. 1987) and by the Eighth Circuit in
Sprynczynatyk v. General Motors Corp., 771 F.2d 1112 (8th Cir. 1985).
123. Borawick v. Shay, 68 F.3d 597, 608 (2d Cir. 1995).
124. [d. at 607.
125. [d. (quoting WRIGHT & GoLD, supra note 80, at 169-170).
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conclusion that the hypnotically-induced testimony is unreliable. 126
Although federal courts recognize the benefits of the Hurd
procedural safeguards, many conclude that courts should have
discretion to balance all factors in determining the reliability of
hypnotically-refreshed testimony, including weighing such
testimony's probative value against its prejudicial effect. 127
The Hurd guidelines generally represent the type of inquiry
into reliability which is required, but a court need not automatically rely on these safeguards to determine admissibility.128 Even if all of the Hurd safeguards are satisfied, a party
may still demonstrate by expert testimony that hypnosis distorted a witness' memory.129 On the other hand, even when
flawed hypnosis procedures exist, a court may decide that a
witness' testimony was, nonetheless, not affected by the dangers associated with hypnosis. 1so
By following the totality-of-the-circumstances theory, the
Borawick court avoided the inflexibility associated with per se
approaches. 1S1 The court determined that per se rules of inclusion or exclusion were "too blunt a tool" with which to address concerns regarding the admissibility of hypnotically-refreshed testimony.132 Ultimately, the Second Circuit relied on
the totality-of-the-circumstances theory to evaluate the admissibility of Borawick's testimony.13s

126. [d. at 607. The Second Circuit found that even if hypnosis procedures are
flawed, a trial court may still find indicia of reliability sufficiently independent of
the dangers associated with hypnosis. [d. at 608. (citing McQueen v. Garrison, 814
F.2d 951, 958 (4th Cir. 1987».
127. [d. at 605. The Second Circuit adopted this theory of admissibility after
examination of the other three approaches. Borawick v. Shay, 68 F.3d 597 (2d Cir.
1995).
128. Borawick v. Shay, 68 F.3d 597, 606 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing McQueen v.
Garrison, 814 F.2d 951, 958 (4th Cir. 1987) (referring to Bernard Diamond, [nher~
ent Problems in the Use of Pretrial Hypnosis on a Prospective Witness, 68 CAL. L.
REv. 313 (1980».
129. McQueen v. Garrison, 814 F.2d 951, 958 (4th Cir. 1987).
130. [d.
131. Borawick v. Shay, 68 F.3d 597, 609 (2d Cir. 1995).
132. [d. at 607.
133. [d. at 607-608.
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v. COURT'S ANALYSIS
The Second Circuit began its analysis of Borawick by acknowledging that it presented a case of first impression in the
Circuit. 134 Although state and federal courts had previously
considered the issue of admissibility of testimony of memories
elicited as a result of hypnosis, nearly all of these cases dealt
with the issue in the context of hypnosis specifically, intended
to enhance a memory of a particular known or suspected occurrence. 135 Borawick, however, addressed the issue of whether a
court should admit testimony about memories of childhood
sexual abuse recalled for the first time in adulthood as a result
of hypnosis administered as part of a general psychotherapy
session. 136
A. THE DISTRICT COURT'S APPROACH USING MANDATORY SAFEGUARDS

The district court approached the issue of admissibility of
hypnotically-induced testimony by evaluating the facts of
Borawick's case in light of specific procedural safeguards. 137
These safeguards necessitated a showing that the hypnotist
possessed the appropriate qualifications, avoided adding elements to the subject's recollections during hypnosis, and made
available a permanent record of the hypnosis sessions. 138 An
additional safeguard required that the hypnotically-induced
.testimony be accompanied by corroborating evidence. 139
In evaluating Borawick's testimony according to these
safeguards, the district court found that although the evidence
did not show that St. Regis added anything to Borawick's recollections, he lacked proper qualifications as a hypnotist. 140
Further, St. Regis could not produce a record of the hypnosis

134. Borawick v. Shay, 68 F.3d 597, 598 (2d Cir. 1995).
135. [d. at 600. See supra note 7.
136. Borawick v. Shay, 68 F.3d 597, 600 (2d Cir. 1995).
137. Borawick v. Shay, 842 F. Supp. 1501, 1505 (D. Conn. 1994). See also State
v. Hurd, 432 A.2d 86, 95-96 (N.J. 1981).
138. [d. at 1505.
139. [d.
140. [d. at 1507-1509.
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sessions. 141 At this stage, the court did not decide the question of corroborating evidence. 142 The cornerstone of the
court's decision to grant the in limine motion excluding
Borawick's testimony of sexual abuse was St. Regis' lack of
appropriate qualifications. 143
B. THE SECOND CIRCUIT'S REVIEW OF THE DISTRICT COURT'S
DECISION: THE TOTALITY-OF-THE-CIRCUMSTANCES APPROACH

The Second Circuit found the procedural safeguards approach, which the district court extracted from Hurd, to be too
rigid. 1« After reviewing the possible approaches to the admissibility of hypnotically-refreshed testimony,145 the Second
Circuit settled on the more flexible totality-of-the-circumstances approach as the most appropriate because it avoided
the strict admissibility rules of the alternative approaches. 146
The Second Circuit provided two rationales for choosing
the totality-of-the-circumstances approach. 147 First, reliance
on procedural safeguards as the sole criteria of admissibility
may not sufficiently illustrate the problems associated with
hypnosis. 148 In particular, a simple set of safeguards may
give hypnotically-refreshed testimony an "aura of reliability" in
the eyes of the jury.149 Second, relying on the Fourth Circuit's
decision in McQueen v. Garrison/ 50 the Second Circuit acknowledged the drawbacks of the procedural safeguards theory.151 The McQueen court reasoned that although the safeguards are relevant to whether the hypnotically-induced testi141. [d.
142. Borawick v. Shay, 842 F. Supp. 1501, 1508 n.15. (D. Conn. 1994).
143. [d. at 1507-1509.
144. Borawick v. Shay, 68 F.3d 597, 607 (2d Cir. 1995). The Second Circuit
reviewed the district court's grant of the in limine motion under a de novo standard. [d. at 601.
145. See supra notes 72-133 and accompanying text for a discussion of the approaches to the admissibility of hypnotically-induced testimony. The four approaches to admissibility include per se admissibility, per se inadmissibility, the procedural safeguards theory, and the totality-of-the-circumstances theory.
146. Borawick v. Shay, 68 F.3d 597, 607-608 (2d Cir. 1995).
[d. at 607-608.
148. [d. at 607.
149. [d. See also WRIGHT & GoLD, supra note 80, at 169-170.
150. 814 F.2d 951 (4th Cir. 1987).
151. Borawick v. Shay, 68 F.3d 597, 605-606 (2d Cir. 1995).
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mony is properly admitted, admissibility must not rest exclusively on the reliability of the procedures used in hypnosis. 152
That court explained that notwithstanding the presence of all
safeguards, a party may still use expert testimony to demonstrate that hypnosis distorted a witness' memory. 153 The
McQueen court further reasoned that if flawed hypnosis procedures exist, a court might nonetheless find through other corroborating evidence that the witness' testimony is sufficiently
removed from the dangers associated with hypnosis and is
therefore admissible. 154
An Eighth Circuit decision, Sprynczynatyk v. General Motors Corp.,155 supports the Fourth Circuit's decision in
McQueen. 156 In Sprynczynatyk, the Eighth Circuit instructed
district courts, in cases involving hypnosis, to conduct pretrial

hearings on procedures used during hypnosis sessions to assess
the effect of hypnosis on the reliability of the associated testimony.157 Although the Sprynczynatyk court adopted the Hurd
safeguards in its analysis, it limited district courts to a <;letermination regarding the degree to which hypnotists followed the
safeguards. 15s The court's analysis of the admissibility question continued with consideration of several extrinsic factors.159 Finally, it directed district courts to determine, on a
case-by-case basis and "in view of all the circumstances,"
whether the proposed testimony is sufficiently reliable. l60 In
effect, courts must determine whether the risk that the testimony reflects a distorted memory is so great that the probative

152. McQueen v. Garrison, 814 F.2d 951, 958 (4th Cir. 1987).
153. [d.
154. [d.
155. 771 F.2d 1112 (8th Cir. 1985).
156. [d.
157. [d. at 1122-23. The proponent of the hypnotically-enhanced testimony bears
the burden of proof during this proceeding. [d. at 1123.
158. [d. at 1123.
159. [d. These factors include the appropriateness of using hypnosis for the
kind of memory loss involved and whether any evidence exists to corroborate the
hypnotically-refreshed testimony. [d.
160. Sprynczynatyk v. General Motors Corp., 771 F.2d 1112, 1123 (8th Cir.
1985).
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value of the testimony is destroyed. 161
The Borawick court followed the flexible approach used in
the Fourth and Eighth Circuits, consisting of an examination
of non-exclusive factors based on all relevant circumstances. 162 This examination embodies the totality-of-the-circumstances approach. 163 Determination of the admissibility of
hypnotically-refreshed testimony requires balancing these
factors on a case-by-case basis. l64
1. Non-Exclusive Factors

After deciding on the totality-of-the-circumstances approach to analyze the question of the admissibility of hypnotically-refreshed testimony in Borawick, the Second Circuit suggested a non-exclusive list of factors for a district court to
weigh on a case-by-case basis when ruling on admissibility.165
These factors, while more refined and not mandatory, resemble
the procedural safeguards enunciated in Hurd. 166
A court should consider whether the refreshed memory
concerns a known public event experienced by the subject or
whether it is refreshed, albeit not deliberately, as a result of
therapy.167 A court should also consider whether, before or
during the hypnosis, the hypnotist made any extraneous suggestions regarding the subject of hypnosis which may have
become part of the witness' memory.16S Further, a court
should consider the presence or absence of a permanent record
of the hypnosis sessions to ascertain whether the hypnotist

161. [d. The Eighth Circuit ruled that the evidentiary problem created by hypo
nosis is directly within the control of the district courts. The district court, not the
jury, has authority to make a preliminary determination of admissibility as it does
with other evidentiary questions. [d.
162. Borawick v. Shay, 68 F.3d 597, 608 (2d Cir. 1995). The Fourth Circuit
decision is McQueen v. Garrison, 814 F.2d 951, 958 (4th Cir. 1987). The decision
from the Eighth Circuit is Sprynczynatyk v. General Motors Corp., 771 F.2d 1112
(8th Cir. 1985).
163. Borawick v. Shay, 68 F.2d 597, 607·608 (2d Cir. 1995).
164. [d. at 608.
165. [d.
166. [d. See also State v. Hurd, 432 A.2d 86, 96·97 (N.J. 1981).
167. Borawick v. Shay, 68 F.3d 597, 608 (2d Cir. 1995).
168. [d.
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used reliable procedures. 169 Also, a court should consider the
hypnotist's qualifications. 170 Additionally, the court should
weigh any corroborating evidence that tends to support the
reliabili ty of the hypnotically-refreshed memories.171 Further,
evidence of the subject's ability to be hypnotized may be relevant.172 A court should also consider any expert evidence offered by the parties as to the reliability of the procedures used
by the hypnotist. 173 Lastly, a court should hold a pretrial evidentiary hearing to enable the parties to present expert evidence and to test credibility through cross-examination. 174
The Second Circuit held that while exercising its discretion
whether to admit the post-hypnotic testimony, the trial court
should weigh the factors in favor and against the reliability of
the hypnosis procedure. 175 The party seeking to admit the
hypnotically-refreshed testimony has the burden of persuading
the district court that the factors lean toward admissibility.176
2. Conclusion of the Borawick Court
The Second Circuit found the district court's approach to
the admissibility question too rigid because it did not adequately address the problems associated with hypnoticallyinduced testimony and because it created a risk of exclusion of
reliable testimony. 177 Nevertheless, the Court affirmed the
district court's ruling on the in limine motion to exclude
Borawick's hypnotically-induced testimony.178 The appellate
court used the totality-of-the-circumstances theory to exclude
Borawick's testimony of childhood sexual abuse. 179 The perceived incredibility of Borawick's allegations further
strengthened the court's decision. 180

169. [d.
170. [d.
171. [d.

172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

Borawick v. Shay, 68 F.3d 597, 608 (2d Cir. 1995).
[d.
[d.
[d.

[d. at 608-609. See also State v. Hurd, 432 A.2d 86, 97 (N.J. 1981).
Borawick v. Shay, 68 F.3d 597, 607-608 (2d Cir. 1995).
[d. at 609.
[d.
ld. Borawick made far-fetched and wild accusations against many people,
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The Second Circuit acknowledged that St. Regis lacked
appropriate qualifications as a hypnotist. 181 Although
Borawick and Dr. Peters stated that they considered St. Regis
to be fully qualified, the Court noted that his education ended
in high school and that he had no formal training in psychiatry
or psychotherapy.182 In addition, the Court emphasized that
St. Regis kept no permanent record of his sessions with
Borawick and did not provide any written explanation of the
procedures he used. 183 As a result, the Second Circuit acknowledged that the district court had no means to evaluate
whether St. Regis made suggestive remarks to Borawick, possibly affecting her recollections during hypnosis.l 84
Finally, the Court noted that, prior to testifying, St. Regis
read portions of Borawick's deposition transcript. 185 This
caused the Second Circuit to doupt St. Regis because of the
possibility that his testimony may simply have reflected his
reading of Borawick's deposition rather than his true experience. 186
Borawick presented corroborating evidence in support of
her allegations, including letters in which Borawick's sister
recounted her own experiences with childhood sexual
abuse. 187 However, the Second Circuit found this evidence too
weak to overcome the strong evidence against admissibility.l88 For the foregoing reasons, the Second Circuit held that
the totality-of-the-circumstances theory barred Borawick from
testifying regarding her memories of sexual abuse. 1S9

some familiar to her and some unfamiliar. These allegations, including sexual
abuse by men whom Borawick believed were members of the Masons as well as
rituals involving dead pigs and people dressed in black robes, reinforced the Second Circuit's decision to exclude her testimony. [d.
181. Borawick v. Shay, 68 F.3d 597, 607-609 (2d Cir. 1995).
182. [d. at 609.
183. [d.
184. [d.
185. [d.
186. Borawick v. Shay, 68 F.3d 597, 609 (2d Cir. 1995).
187. [d.
188. [d.
189. [d.
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C. APPLYING THE DAUBERT STANDARD FOR ADMISSION OF SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE

After affirming the in limine motion excluding Borawick's
testimony, the Second Circuit gave cursory consideration to
Borawick's argument that the Supreme Court's recent decision
in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals 190 rendered her
testimony admissible. 191 In Daubert, the Supreme Court ruled
that a judge should undertake a preliminary evaluation of
whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning and
methodology properly can be applied to the facts at issue. 192
Pertinent factors include whether the scientific theory in evidence could be tested, whether it had been subjected to peer
review and publication in the scientific community, whether
the known or potential rate of error is considerable, whether
the controls used were adequate, and whether the theory had
gained general acceptance in the relevant scientific community.193
The Second Circuit held that the Daubert decision did not
apply directly to the instant case because Daubert created
standards addressed to the admissibility of data derived from
scientific techniques or expert opinions. l94 By contrast, the
Borawick court was concerned with the question of whether
the plaintiff was a competent witness and whether her testimony was admissible. 195

190. 509 u.S. 579 (1993).
191. Borawick v. Shay, 68 F.3d 597, 610 (2d Cir. 1995).
192. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579, 592-593 (1993).
This duty of assessment derives from the Federal Rules of Evidence, especially
Rule 702. [d. at 595.
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 reads:
If scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge
will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or
to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training or education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or
otherwise.

FED. R. EVID. 702.
193. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579, 593-594 (1993).
194. Borawick v. Shay, 68 F.3d 597, 610 (2d Cir. 1995).
195. [d.
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Although the Second Circuit held that Daubert did not
directly apply, the court maintained that its position was consistent with the Daubert decision. 196 In Daubert, the Supreme
Court articulated a system by which a court rules on the admissibility of scientific evidence by weighing various considerations on a case-specific basis. 197 Further, Daubert provides
for admission of expert scientific testimony, regardless of
whether it is generally accepted, if its reliability can be sufficiently demonstrated. 19s If Borawick had presented some indicia of reliability regarding the methods used in and the results of her hypnosis, the Second Circuit might have been more
sympathetic to her Daubert-based argument. 199
VI. CRITIQUE
The Borawick decision is important because it addresses
the admissibility of memories induced through clinical hypnosis as a part of psychotherapy, a use of hypnosis not widely
considered by other courts. 200 Previously, courts primarily
considered testimony resulting from forensic hypnosis used to
enhance memory of a specific event.201 Generally, courts and
parties have failed to recognize the differences between these
uses of hypnosis. 202
A. COURTS SHOULD UTILIZE DIFFERENT EVIDENTIARY STANDARDS DEPENDING ON THE PuRPOSE OF THE HYPNOSIS

Forensic and clinical hypnotists use similar memory enhancing techniques to attain different ends. 203 The forensic
hypnotist uses hypnosis to retrieve specific memories which
will be helpful in reconstructing the past in a legal proceeding. 204 A clinical hypnotist uses hypnosis to better understand
a subject's subjective perceptions of the past rather than to pre-

196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

[d.
[d.
[d.
Borawick v. Shay, 68 F.3d 597, 610 (2d Cir. 1995).
Borawick V. Shay, 68 F.3d 597, 600 (2d Cir. 1995).
[d. See supra note 7.
Kanovitz, supra note 10, at 1192 n.17.
[d. at 1217.
[d. at 1217-18.
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serve those memories for litigation. 205 Accordingly, the
clinical hypnotist runs a greater risk of emotional involvement
in the subject's recovery and, therefore, may overstep the
boundaries of interviewing neutrality. 206 Since the forensic
hypnotist approaches hypnosis with litigation in mind, he or
she can more easily avoid giving direction to the hypnotized
subject that would interfere with original memories. 207 With
this focus, the forensic hypnotist may maintain an emotional
distance from the subject and not influence the emerging memory.208
The diverse approaches used by hypnosis professionals
indicate the need for standards concerning admissibility of
such testimony based on the purpose of the hypnosis. Clinical
hypnotists are often not well informed about the legal implications of a hypnosis session conducted in a relaxed manner. 209
Therefore, memories recalled in the clinical setting have a
greater risk of contamination from suggestibility, confabulation, and memory hardening. 210 Conversely, forensic hypnotists may realize the legal implications of inaccurate or unbelievable memories. 211 These hypnotists usually do not reveal
any expectations to the subject in advance of the session or ask
the subject leading questions. 212
Ai; a result of the diverse approaches used by hypnotists,
testimony resulting from forensic hypnosis, used to recall a
specific event, may be more reliable and therefore should enjoy
greater weight on the issue of admissibility. Memories recalled
during clinical therapy for other reasons should be subject to

205. [d. at 1218.
206. [d. Leading questions and suggestions can slip into a clinical hypnotist's
session without the awareness of the hypnotist because of this emotional attachment. The interview becomes more automatic than carefully orchestrated to preserve accurate memories. [d. at 1218-19.
207. Kanovitz, supra note 10, at 1217-18.
208. [d. at 1218.
209. [d. at 1218 n.141. Clinical hypnotists can be ignorant of the potential of
hypnosis to change memory. Consequently, clinical literature is beginning to inform
these therapists about the legal ramifications of hypnosis and to recommend integrating specified forensic procedural safeguards into hypnotic therapy sessions.
Some writers suggest videotaping the clinical hypnosis session. [d. at 1218 n.141.
210. [d. See supra notes 62-71.
211. Kanovitz, supra note 10, at 1217-18.
212. [d. at 1219.
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greater scrutiny before admission.
B. PROBLEMS AsSOCIATED WITH USE OF A TOTALITY-OF-THECIRCUMSTANCES TEST TO DETERMINE ADMISSIBILITY OF HypNOTICALLY-INDUCED TESTIMONY

The totality-of-the-circumstances test provides an equitable forum in which to consider issues of reliability and admissibility because evaluating admissibility of hypnotically-induced
testimony should warrant different evidentiary standards.
These considerations should include an inquiry into the context, forensic or clinical, in which the subject recalls memories.
However, the totality-of-the-circumstances test contains several
problems, including witness competency, judicial discretion and
detection of suggestibility and confabulation, which a court
should bear in mind when balancing factors to determine admissibility.
1.

Witness competency

Witness competency presents the first problem. Historically, American courts were reluctant to admit testimony uncovered by hypnosis. 213 In fact, the California Supreme Court in
1897 stated that "the law of the United States does not recognize hypnotism.,,214 Currently, courts fail to apply uniform
rules to the admission of hypnotically-induced testimony.215
Most courts find a previously hypnotized witness competent if
the witness' testimony is based on a hypnotically-refreshed
recollection. 216 Some courts prohibit testimony from a witness
who does not have an independent recollection of the events
described but who merely testified concerning memories explored and revealed under hypnosis. 217 Other courts bar testimony by a previously-hypnotized witness when the hypnotist
used suggestive procedures. 218
213. R.T.C., The Admissibility of Testimony Influenced by Hypnosis, 67 VA. L.
REv. 1203, 1204 (1981) [hereinafter R.T.C.).
214. Id. (citing People v. Ebanks, 49 P. 1049, 1053 (1897».
215. R.T.C., supra note 213, at 1204.
216. Id. See, e.g., United States v. Awkard, 597 F.2d 667 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 885 (1979).
217. R.T.C., supra note 213, at 1205. See also State v. Mena, 624 P.2d 1274
(Ariz. 1981).
218. R.T.C., supra note 213, at 1205. See also State v. Hurd, 414 A.2d 291
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Federal Rule of Evidence 601, however, contains a strong
presumption in favor of witness competency.219 The Rule presumes that cross-examination, the oath and the jury's opportunity to observe a witness first-hand are sufficient safeguards
against unreliable testimony.22o
However, judges in some cases have concluded that Rule
601 leaves them with the discretion to disqualify witnesses
with limited mental or moral capacities. 221 In decisions following the enactment of Rule 601, courts have conducted competency hearings and psychiatric evaluations although the
Rule seemingly eliminated these powers.222 As a result, most
courts treat witness competency issues as they did before the

(N.J. 1980).
219. Federal Rule of Evidence 601 states:
Every person is competent to be a witness except
as otherwise provided in these rules. However, in civil
actions and proceedings, with respect to an element of a
claim or defense as to which State law supplies the rule
of decision, the competency of a witness shall be determined in accordance with State law.

Evm. 601.
The advisory committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence characterized the
Rule as a "general ground clearing," eliminating almost all categories of witness
competency which operated as a bar to testifying at common law. FED. R. EVID.
601 Advisory Committee's notes.
220. See generally WRIGHT & GoLD, supra note 80, at 127. ("The only effect the
oath can have, then, is to misleadingly cloak the testimony in the ceremonial garb
of truthfulness"). See State ex reI Collins v. Superior Court, 644 P.2d 1266, 1274
(Ariz. 1982) (where a witness sincerely believes the truth of his or her memories,
he or she will become immune to effective impeachment through cross-examination); State v. Martin, 684 P.2d 651, 656 (Wash. 1984) ("the subjective conviction
in the truth of the memory...eliminates fear of perjury as a factor ensuring reliable
testimony"). But see Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 61 (1987) (even in the case of
a confident defendant, cross-examination is an effective tool for revealing inconsistencies).
221. Victor J. Gold, Do the Federal Rules of Evidence Matter?, 25 LOy. L.A. L.
REv. 909, 911 (1992).
222. 1d. See also United States v. Odom, 736 F.2d 104, 111 (4th Cir. 1984) (a
district judge has "great latitude in the procedure he may follow in determining
the competency of a witness to testify.").
FED. R.
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enactment of Rule 601. 223
In cases involving previously-hypnotized subjects, experts
can advise the jury regarding the inherent problems associated
with hypnosis. 224 Unfortunately, the jury is in a poor position
to weigh the testimony in light of those problems because neither the hypnotist nor the subject can separate the real memory from confabulation or memories resulting from suggestion. 225
Some courts have adopted a modified ·per se witness incompetency approach to determine the admissibility ofhypnotically-induced testimony.226 Under this approach, the witness
is incompetent to testify except as to matters recalled prior to
hypnosis. 227 Some courts acknowledge, however, that even
pre-hypnosis testimony may be adversely affected by subsequent hypnosis due to increased confidence in memory overall. 228 The danger of hypnosis tainting pre-hypnosis memories
seems greatest in the clinical setting due to possible emotional
attachment of the hypnotist to the subject.229 For this reason,
courts should examine the competence of clinical hypnosis
subjects more closely even in light of Rule 601. Forensic hypnosis does not seem to present the same difficulties because the
procedures used are carefully tailored for use in litigation.

223. Victor J. Gold, Do the Federal Rules of Evidence Matter?, 25 LOY. L.A. L.

REv. 909, 911 (1992). See supra note 219 for Advisory Committee comment to Federal Rule of Evidence 601. The supreme court of at least one state has found that
where a witness's testimony has been tainted due to hypnosis, the trial court has
discretion to determine whether the witness is competent to testify as to matters
untainted by the hypnosis. State v. Iwakiri, 682 P.2d 571, 579 (Idaho 1984).
224. WRIGHT & GoLD, supra note 80, at 127. These problems include suggestibility, confabulation, and memory hardening; see supra notes 62-71 and accompanying text.
225. [d. at 128.
226. [d. at 128-29.
227. [d. See also People v. Shirley, 723 P.2d 1354, 1384 (Cal. 1982), cert. denied
459 U.S. 860 (1982).
228. WRIGHT & GoLD, supra note 80, at 130.
229. Kanovitz, supra note 10, at 1218. See supra notes 203-212 and accompanying text.
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Judicial discretion

A second problem with the totality-of-the-circumstances
approach comes from the "unprincipled" discretion exercised in
the application of the balancing test. 230 The balancing test
may invite courts to spend insufficient time weighing both
sides to reach an equitable conclusion. 231 Since the test is
subjective, a judge may not properly review all the evidence
bearing on reliability.232 The judge's decision on admissibility
may have more to do with which party presented the evidence
rather than its reliability.233
In at least one case, a state supreme court advocated deference to the trial court record to determine the reliability of
hypnotically-induced testimony and consequently avoided this
problem. 234 In People v. Romero, the court considered whether
a previously-hypnotized witness' trial testimony was sufficiently reliable and therefore admissible. 235 The trial court in that
case used a totality-of-the-circumstances approach to determine reliability.236 The state supreme court accepted the findings made by the trial court with respect to reliability and held
that the record adequately supported the trial court's decision
to admit testimony from previously hypnotized witnesses. 237
A court using the Romero approach avoids the problem of
unprincipled judicial discretion on the part of a higher court by
accepting the trial court record. A trial court has a better op-

230. WRIGHT & GoLD, supra note 80, at 175. See Victor J. Gold, Limiting Judicial Discretion to Exclude Prejudicial Evidence, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 59, 61
(1984) (The grant of discretion contained in Rule 403 has been taken by the courts
as "license for an unprincipled, ad hoc approach to each case. Most courts are content to conclude evidence has probative value or is unfairly prejudicial without
considering the meaning of those terms. ").
231. WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 80, at 175.
232. Id. See also Victor J. Gold, Federal Rule of Evidence 403: Observations in
the Nature of Unfairly Prejudicial Evidence, 58 WASH. L. REv. 497, 500-501 (1983)
(most courts "utterly fail to conduct the required balancing test, or while purporting to balance, give no hint as to how or why a particular balance was struck").
233. WRIGHT & GoLD, supra note 80, at 175.
234. People v. Romero, 745 P.2d 1003, 1017-18 (Colo. 1987), cert. denied 485
U.S. 990 (1988).
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 1018.
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portunity to view witnesses first-hand and to make individualized factual inquiries in each case to determine reliability and
admissibility. Review by a higher court can then be under an
abuse of discretion standard.
3.

Detection of suggestion and confabulation

Under the totality-of-the-circumstances approach to admissibility, a fact finder weighs the effectiveness and thoroughness
of the procedures used during hypnosis. However, the fact
finder may never detect the presence of suggestion, confabulation, or memory hardening. 238 Estimation of the presence of
these phenomena is speculative at best and may be completely
wrong, possibly violating a party's due process and confrontation rights by admission of unreliable hypnotically-induced
testimony. 239
This third problem, however, is not unique to hypnoticallyinduced testimony.24o For example, a witness could be susceptible to suggestion from his or her lawyer, from family members or from the media. Even idle conversation with another
witness concerning the same event can lead to an alteration of
a witness' memory.241 Although the possibility of alteration of
memory from hypnosis is greater than the possibility of alteration from talking to another witness, it remains a question of
degree. 242 Since the modification of a witness' memory is not
accurately measurable, a balancing test is necessarily
inexact. 243 Indeed, using Federal Rule of Evidence Rule 403,
a court balances prejudicial value against probative value for
all types of evidence. 244
238. WRIGHT & GoLD, supra note 80, at 174. See also Bernard Diamond, Inherent Problems in the Use of Pretrial Hypnosis on a Prospective Witness, 68 CALIF.
L. REv. 313, 337 (1980). ("No one, regardless of experience, can verify the accuracy
of the hypnotically enhanced memory"). Id.
239. WRIGHT & GoLD, supra note 80, at 174.
240. [d.
241. State v. Iwakiri, 682 P.2d 571, 579 (Idaho 1984).
242. [d.
243. WRIGHT & GoLD, supra note 80, at 174.
244. Federal Rule of Evidence Rule 403 states:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger
of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading
the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of
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Suggestion, confabulation and memory hardening are
impossible to detect with certainty. Therefore, hypnoticallyinduced testimony should be subject to the balancing test provided by Rule 403 to the best of the court's ability.
In conclusion, the totality-of-the-circumstances test does
not constitute a completely effective method for handling the
problems of witness competency, judicial discretion, and detection of suggestibility and confabulation. Nonetheless, the totality-of-the-circumstances test remains a viable basis for determining admissibility of hypnotically-induced testimony. However, the test should be refined to better accommodate these
concerns.

C. A PROPOSED SOLUTION TO REMEDY THE INADEQUACY OF
THE TOTALITY-OF-THE-CIRCUMSTANCES APPROACH

The traditional totality-of-the-circumstances test contains
a significant inadequacy in that the test neglects consideration
of the subject's hypnotizability.u5 Instead, the test focuses
almost exclusively on the problems of suggestibility, confabulation and memory hardening; thereby ignoring the reality that a
subject's hypnotizability presents another important problem
with the reliability of hypnotically-induced testimony.
No more than 10 to 15 percent of the population is highly
hypnotizable. 246 In conducting research with these subjects,
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
FED. R. Evm. 403.
245. Kanovitz, supra note 10, at 1220, 1235 n.214.
246. Kanovitz, supra note 10, at 1235 n.214. The author of this law review article asserts that hypnotizability is a "stable trait that can be measured." Id. at
1220. She includes research into the susceptibility of highly hypnotizable subjects.
An experiment, conducted by Laurence, Nadon, Nogrady and Perry, involved planting false memories into subjects especially selected for their high level of
hypnotizability. Twenty-two percent of the subjects would accept a hypnotic memory transplant that they had been awakened by a loud bang on a particular night
of the previous week. An additional 27 percent, who had previously been certain
that they had slept through the night, were confused after the experiment about
how well they had slept. The remaining 51 percent flatly rejected the attempt to
alter their memory and stood by their initial sleep recollections. Attempts to repro-
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hypnotists successfully plant false memories that will carry
over into waking state. 247 These highly hypnotizable subjects
have "spirited imaginations" and ''vivid powers of imagery.,,248
They tend to fantasize a great deal of the time and are usually
able to see, smell, and touch the things they fantasize. 249
Highly hypnotizable people have intense powers of imagination
and often mistake what they have read, seen or heard for their
own experiences. 260 Moreover, these subjects are able to slip
into self-hypnotic states without awareness or effort.261
Problems of memory elasticity, or a modification in memory, result from cognitive changes that take place during
hypnosis.262 Cognitive changes occur according to
hypnotizability.253 For example, evidence exists to show that
only a highly hypnotizable subject is capable of experiencing
hypnosis at levels which are deep enough to confuse events
taking place in the mind with reality.2M Further, these highly
hypnotizable subjects tend to be abnormally susceptible to
suggestion. 266 However, no conclusive evidence exists to establish that a hypnotist could successfully create "whole memories" of events never experienced by the subject. 266 The fact
remains, however, that highly hypnotizable subjects are more
susceptible to the problems associated with hypnosis, especial-

duce results like these with subjects of normal hypnotizability have not been successful. [d. at 1236 (discussing Laurence et aI., Duality, Dissociation and Memory
Creation in Highly Hypnotizable Subjects, 34 INT'L J. CLINICAL & EXPERIMENTAL
HYPNOSIS 295 (1986».
247. Kanovitz, supra note 10, at 1235 n.214.
248. [d.
249. [d. (citing EUGENE BLISS, MULTIPLE PERSONALITY, ALLIED DISORDERS AND
HYPNOSIS 73-81 (Oxford, 1986) [hereinafter BLISS] and ERNEST HILGRAD, DIVIDED
CONSCIOUSNESS: MULTIPLE CONTROLS IN HUMAN THOUGHT AND ACTION 88 (John
Wiley & Sons, 1977) [hereinafter HILGRAD]).
250. Kanovitz, supra note 10, at 1235 n.214.
251. [d.
252. [d. (citing BLISS, supra note 248, at 98-99 and HILGRAD, supra note 248, at
163-65). The cognitive changes which may occur as a result of hypnosis are increased responsiveness to suggestion, reduced critical judgment, increased capacity
for fantasy formation, and diminished reality testing. [d.
253. [d.
254. [d. Memory hardening is a phenomenon which gives the subject enhanced
confidence in the facts remembered, regardless of whether the facts are true or
false. Borawick v. Shay, 68 F.3d 597, 603 (2d Cir. 1995).
255. Kanovitz, supra note 10, at 1235 n.214.
256. [d. at 1236.
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ly confabulation. 257
A more complete and accurate approach for courts to take
when faced with the issue of admission of hypnotically-induced
testimony would include an inquiry into the level of
hypnotizability of the subjece58 as well as the context in
which the hypnosis took place, the competency of the witness,
the detection of suggestion or confabulation and the adequacy
of the trial court's analysis of reliability. A previously adopted
approach, such as the Hurd procedural safeguardE;! approach or
the totality-of-the-circumstances test, best evaluates these
inquiries. Trial courts could exclude hypnotically-induced testimony from highly hypnotizable subjects. 259 By excluding this
group of witnesses, the court can be more confident that testimony susceptible to the possibility of enhanced memory is
eliminated as unreliable.

VII. CONCLUSION
In Borawick v. Shay,260 the Second Circuit held that the
admissibility of hypnotically-refreshed recollections should be
determined on a case-by-case basis using the totality-of-thecircumstances approach and considering non-exclusive factors.261 Using this approach, the court ruled that Borawick's
hypnotically-induced memories of child sexual abuse, recalled
through the use of hypnosis conducted by an unqualified hypnotist who kept no record of the hypnosis sessions, were inadmissible. 262 The Borawick decision marked the first time that
the Second Circuit addressed the question of admissibility of
hypnotically-refreshed testimony regarding childhood sexual
abuse recalled after hypnosis conducted for therapeutic purposes rather than after hypnosis conducted for the specific pur-

257. Id. at 1238.
258. Id.
259. "Hypnotic susceptibility testing can identify individuals who have the capacity to confuse fantasized events for real experiences." Kanovitz, supra note 10,
at 1239 n.229.
260. 68 F.3d 597 (2d Cir. 1995).
261. Borawick v. Shay, 68 F.3d 597, 607-608 (2d Cir. 1995).
262. Id. at 609-610.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1997

35

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 3 [1997], Art. 8

458

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27:423

pose of recalling such memories. 263 Consequently, this decision seems to expand the opportunities for admission of testimony recalled through clinical hypnosis, provided the totalityof-the-circumstances leaned toward reliability.
Kristy L. Topham·

263. [d. at 600.
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